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★Mark us as a preferred sourceOn 20 October 2026 the European Parliament adopted its position on the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments by 470 votes to 83, with 108 abstentions. MEPs are calling for a standalone EU raw materials agency, a €2 billion fund, a conditional export control on permanent magnet scrap and price-stabilisation tools that would give recycling projects revenue certainty. Seen from the waste sector, this is the clearest signal yet that Brussels treats material recovered from waste as just as strategic as material dug out of a mine.
In short: The Parliament’s position on the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments foresees a standalone EU agency, a €2 billion fund, a conditional restriction on magnet scrap exports and contracts for difference to secure revenue for extraction, processing and recycling projects. The text is now the starting point for negotiations with member states, so the final rules may still change.
What did the European Parliament vote for?
Parliament adopted the original CRMA in December 2023, and the regulation entered into force in May 2024. It set four quantified targets for 2030: at least 10 percent of the EU’s annual consumption from domestic extraction, 40 percent from domestic processing and 25 percent from recycling, with no more than 65 percent of any strategic raw material coming from a single third country. One pillar of the toolbox is the strategic project system – in the latest round, 46 new EU strategic projects were selected, more than half of them recovering raw materials from waste.
The European Commission proposed the amendments in December 2025, following the RESourceEU Action Plan. The report, prepared by Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), was steered by rapporteur Mohammed Chahim, a Dutch Social Democrat. The aim is to channel targeted support along the entire value chain – from mining through processing and refining to recycling – and so diversify EU supply chains. In Parliament’s press release, Chahim described critical raw materials as “the currency of geopolitical power”.
The Parliament’s position can be broken down into five main elements: a new institution, an export control on magnet scrap, price-stabilisation tools, obligations for large companies and the involvement of the defence industry.
A standalone agency and a €2 billion fund
MEPs want the critical raw materials centre set up as a self-standing EU agency with dedicated funding, clear governance and democratic legitimacy. It would bring together market intelligence, resilience planning, stockpiling, joint purchasing, stakeholder engagement and financial instruments. A €2 billion CRM Fund would be attached to it under the EU’s 2028–2034 long-term budget.
What Parliament adds is institutional weight. A standalone agency with its own budget can react to a supply disruption faster and more predictably than a Commission working group. How much of the €2 billion survives will be decided in the negotiations on the next long-term EU budget.
The amount is modest compared with what is happening elsewhere – governments around the world are pouring money into securing supply, a trend visible in the global mineral rush driven by war and AI. Still, it would be the first EU instrument dedicated specifically to the security of critical raw material supply.
Export controls on magnet scrap: keep recyclable material in Europe
For the waste sector, the most interesting proposal is the conditional export control clause. It would empower the Commission to restrict exports of permanent magnet scrap and waste so that recyclable material stays inside the EU. Neodymium-iron-boron magnets are at the heart of electric motors, wind turbines, hard drives and many household appliances, and their rare earth content flows almost entirely through China.
The logic is clear. China does not ban critical raw material exports outright – it regulates them through an increasingly complex licensing system, and it restricts the export of processing technologies as well. If Europe meanwhile ships its own magnet scrap abroad cheaply, it sells off the very feedstock on which it wants to build its recycling industry.
Export controls are a double-edged sword, however. In the case of aluminium scrap, the Commission stepped back from export restrictions this autumn, because recyclers argued that without sufficient domestic demand a restriction would have destroyed the value of scrap and, with it, recycling investment. Magnets are a different case: European processing capacity is clearly lacking, and volumes are smaller. That is why the conditional nature of the clause matters. A restriction can work if there are EU plants ready to take the retained scrap; without them it only produces magnets sitting in warehouses.
Price stabilisation: managing the business risk of circularity
MEPs are calling for price-stabilisation mechanisms such as contracts for difference (CfDs), which would give developers of extraction, processing and recycling projects revenue certainty. The principle is simple: a reference price is fixed. If the market price falls below it, the project receives the difference; if it rises above, the project pays back the surplus. In the energy sector, for renewable power plants, this is already standard practice.
For recyclers this may be the single most important element. A battery recycling plant’s revenue depends on world market prices for recovered lithium, nickel and cobalt, and those prices have swung wildly in recent years. Plants are being permitted – such as Viridis Recycling’s battery recycling site in Hanau – but banks look at the next five years of cash flow, not at the long-term growth curve. The same applies to silver and silicon recovery from solar panels, where profitability hinges almost entirely on the silver price.
Parliament would also expand the EU’s existing joint purchasing mechanism so that member states and businesses can build up strategic stockpiles of critical raw materials in a coordinated way. Stockpiling improves crisis resilience and could also mean a stable buyer for European processors.
Resilience obligations for large companies
Under the amendments, it would be the Commission, not individual member states, that identifies which large companies use critical raw materials in a strategic sector – for example batteries, hydrogen equipment, aircraft, drones, satellites or advanced chips. These companies would face resilience obligations: they would have to map their supply chains and take measures to reduce their vulnerabilities.
Centralised identification simplifies things: a manufacturer operating in several member states would not have to adapt to 27 different interpretations. MEPs also want the Commission to open calls for strategic projects at least twice a year, giving companies clear and predictable deadlines.
The defence dimension
Parliament explicitly states that critical raw materials are a defence and security matter, and asks for the forthcoming European Defence Industry Programme to be mobilised to finance strategic raw material projects. Without tungsten, magnesium, titanium or gallium there is no production of munitions, aircraft or radar, so raw materials policy and the defence industry are becoming ever more intertwined. This could open a new customer base for the waste sector too: among the current strategic projects there is already one recovering aluminium, magnesium and titanium from defence-industry by-products.
What the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments mean for waste management
The key message is that waste management has become part of supply security. The regulation’s 25 percent recycling target can only be met, however, if waste actually reaches the processors. That is the weakest link in the chain.
According to the FutuRaM project’s assessment, products placed on the European market in 2022 contained around 5.2 million tonnes of critical raw materials, yet only 2.1 million tonnes appeared in waste streams, and just 1.4 million tonnes were actually recovered. Technology can help close part of the gap – AI-based sorting, for instance, is being used to pull lithium-ion batteries and other critical-material carriers out of waste streams – but an agency, a fund or an export control will not, by themselves, bring household e-waste back. That takes collection points, incentives and public information.
Three practical consequences can be expected. First, if contracts for difference do materialise, recycling investments become more bankable because revenue depends less on exchange prices. Second, after magnet scrap, a logical next step could be to examine other waste streams containing critical raw materials, such as printed circuit boards or catalysts – the parliamentary text says nothing about this, but the direction is set. Third, supply chain mapping by large companies will give manufacturers their own interest in having their production scrap processed in Europe.
A Hungarian perspective
Hungary is one of Europe’s largest battery manufacturing hubs, so the resilience obligations could also affect the large battery manufacturers operating in the country. According to an earlier estimate by the Hungarian Battery Association (HUBA), waste from the domestic battery industry could rise to around 286,000 tonnes by 2026 – exactly the kind of production scrap on which Dutch, German and Romanian black mass processors are building their business.
Yet not a single Hungarian project received strategic status in the second round. If the Commission opens calls at least twice a year and contracts for difference become available, domestic processing and recycling projects will have a far better starting point. The question is whether a Hungarian player will be ready to take advantage of it.
The international picture points the same way: in the United States, three bipartisan bills aim to remove the regulatory traps around battery recycling, while Japan is using state money to build magnet recycling capacity. The race is less and less about mines and more and more about waste.
What remains open: negotiations with member states
The Parliament’s adopted position on the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments is not final legislation. MEPs can now begin negotiations with member states on the final shape of the law. Several points of contention are foreseeable. Some member states may be wary of yet another standalone EU agency, the fate of the €2 billion fund depends on the 2028–2034 budget as a whole, and the export control carries trade-policy sensitivities. It is also open whether contracts for difference would be funded from EU or national budgets.
For the waste management sector, the main lesson is nevertheless clear. The amended Critical Raw Materials Act treats recovered material not as an environmental side issue but as one of the pillars of Europe’s strategic autonomy. Whether this turns into real plants and real volumes will be decided not only in Brussels, but also at collection points, recycling centres and sorting plants.
Frequently asked questions about the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments
What did the European Parliament vote for on the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments?
The European Parliament adopted its position on 20 October 2026 by 470 votes to 83, with 108 abstentions. MEPs are calling for a standalone EU raw materials agency, a €2 billion fund, a conditional restriction on magnet scrap exports, contracts for difference and an expanded joint purchasing mechanism. The position is the starting point for negotiations with member states.
What would the EU critical raw materials centre be?
Under Parliament’s proposal, the centre would be a self-standing EU agency with dedicated funding and clear governance. It would coordinate market intelligence, resilience planning, stockpiling, joint purchasing and financial instruments. A €2 billion CRM Fund would be attached to it under the EU’s 2028–2034 long-term budget, subject to the outcome of budget negotiations.
Why does the European Parliament want to restrict magnet scrap exports?
The aim is to keep recyclable permanent magnet scrap inside the EU as feedstock for European recyclers. The rare earth content of these magnets flows almost entirely through China, which controls supply through export licensing. The clause is conditional: it is not an automatic ban but an empowerment for the Commission to restrict exports of magnet scrap and waste.
What do contracts for difference mean for recycling plants?
Contracts for difference provide revenue certainty: a reference price is fixed, and if the market price falls below it the project receives the difference, while if it rises above, the project pays back the surplus. Battery recyclers’ revenue depends on volatile lithium, nickel and cobalt prices, so the tool would make their investments more bankable.
When could the amended regulation enter into force?
There is no date yet, because Parliament’s position is not final legislation. MEPs can now begin negotiations with member states on the final shape of the law. Likely points of contention include the standalone agency, the €2 billion fund, which depends on the 2028–2034 budget, and the trade-policy sensitivity of the export control.
Do the Critical Raw Materials Act amendments affect Hungary?
Yes, mainly through the battery industry. Large companies in strategic sectors would have to map their supply chains, which could affect the large battery manufacturers operating in Hungary. The Hungarian Battery Association estimates that domestic battery industry waste could reach around 286,000 tonnes by 2026, yet no Hungarian project received strategic status in the second round.
🔗 Official sources and references: 👉
- European Parliament, press release (October 2026): Critical Raw Materials: securing Europe’s supply and strategic autonomy
- European Parliament, legislative procedure file – 2025/0385(COD): Procedure file
- European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS): Amendments to the Critical Raw Materials Act
- European Commission, proposal – COM(2025) 946: Amendments to the CRMA
- European Commission, RESourceEU Action Plan: press release
- European Parliament, December 2023 press release on adoption of the original regulation: Critical raw materials: plans to secure the EU’s supply
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